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Introduction 
Global political and economic volatility over the 
last decade has created an uncertain policy 
landscape. The established political frameworks of 
neoliberalism and Keynesian social democracy 
have been brought into question by financial 
crisis, recession, and slow ‘recovery’, but also 
more pointedly, by the rise of new political forces 
– ‘populist’, authoritarian, protectionist, anti-
science – that seem to cast the post-1945 global 
settlement into doubt. Related concerns around 
climate change, migration, and a new wave of job-
threatening AI-led technologies have added new 
stresses and anxieties to this geopolitical 
turbulence. 
 
This paper seeks to raise some of the critical 
issues facing international cultural policy in this 
contemporary scenario, focusing on one of the 
key measures of the last decade: UNESCO’s 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of 
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CDCE) 
(UNESCO, 2005). This instrument has come to 
occupy a special place in the framework of 
international cultural law: adopted in 2005, and 
entering into force in 2007, the CDCE became 
widely received as marking a standard-setting and 
progressive breakthrough for cultural policy 
globally — particularly in the way that it linked the 
areas of culture, economy and development — 
even if there have been a number of reservations 
about its legal weight and status. One decade on, 
we now have an opportunity to begin to reflect on 
the CDCE’s contributions and contemporary 
relevance. 
 
As the CDCE has now been in force for over a 
decade, a picture has begun to emerge of its 
record of implementation and some of its impacts, 
contributions and limitations. Most notably, 
UNESCO itself has produced two global 
monitoring reports that draw in particular on the 
periodic reports that Parties (signatories) are 
required to submit to the organisation every four 
years and which detail their experiences with 
implementation (UNESCO 2015; 2017a). These 
periodic reports, together with data and analyses 
drawn from other sources, have allowed the 
authors to build up a detailed account of trends in 
cultural policies and measures in a number of 
different areas, while enabling emergent trends in 
the cultural field to be identified so as to provide 
guidance for implementation looking forward.  
The reports also reflect some of the attempts that 
there have been to widen the focus of the CDCE 
from the issue of the regulation of the trade in 
cultural goods and services to a number of other 
issues that were given less prominence by the 
instrument’s drafters but which have demanded 
greater attention in recent years – such as 
questions of artistic freedom, the status of the 
artist, and gender equality. 
 
It is important from the outset, however, to 
recognise the limitations in the kind of picture 
that is presented in these reports: firstly, due to 
significant gaps in the relevant data and in the 
availability of Parties’ periodic reports; 1 and 
secondly due to the nature of the periodic 
reporting process itself, which tends to reproduce 
the perspectives of the particular 
states/governments that draw them up, leaving a 
gap in critical engagement with the CDCE — a 
situation that has been compounded by a lack of 
civil society involvement and reporting on its 
implementation, at least until recently. In the 
opening to the 2015 monitoring report (UNESCO, 
2015), the organisation’s Director-General had 
written of the need for ‘new discourses and 
approaches to guide cultural policy’, yet there 
remains remarkably little work that aims at 
critically scrutinising the fundamental framing 
assumptions, operational discourses and inherent 
tensions of the contemporary international policy 
agenda around culture, economy and 
development under conditions of rapid, and 
contested, global transformation. 
 
With the above points in mind, this paper 
interrogates the role, purpose and limitations of 
the CDCE as an international keystone of cultural 
 
1 The two global monitoring reports have been based, 
respectively, on an analysis of the 71 and 62 
periodic reports that have been submitted so far 
(which is less than half of the total that had been 
expected for submission; there are currently 146 
parties to the CDCE) and by a lack of data on 
particular areas (see for example UNESCO, 2017: 
28). 
 
  
10 
policy in the contemporary context. This task was 
initiated as a response to a set of priority issues 
that were agreed upon as part of a series of 
discussions between an international network of 
thinkers, activists and representatives of civil 
society organisations that first gathered in 2017 to 
address the contemporary relevance of the CDCE 
(these priority issues are summarised in van Graan 
and Brennert, 2017). The paper also draws on an 
Australian Research Council project ‘UNESCO and 
the Making of Global Cultural Policy: Culture, 
Economy, Development’ — a project framed by an 
urgent need for cultural policy studies to look 
beyond its own policy areas to the wider social 
and political context. The argument made is less 
for ‘ripping it up and starting again’ and more for 
the need to critically take stock and explore new 
ways forward in the search for progressive 
responses to the current conjuncture. 
 
The paper begins by returning to the context in 
which the CDCE was conceived in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. This period was characterised by 
growing unease around the impact of 
globalisation and trade liberalisation on cultural 
goods and services, and the accelerated 
domination of powerful global players as local 
protections were dismantled. These concerns 
were increasingly framed in terms of ‘diversity’ 
and ‘sustainability’, aligning metaphorically with 
the arguments used by the environmental 
movement for resilient ecosystems. The period 
also saw the growing influence of the 
cultural/creative economy agenda within policy 
circles, which emphasised the economic as well as 
the cultural value of cultural commodities. In this 
emergent policy discourse, cultural diversity and 
cultural value could work with the expansion of 
the global economy, as long as we could safeguard 
accumulated and diverse cultural resources for 
future generations. 
 
Two decades on we face a changed global 
landscape, in which many of the sanguine 
assumptions for the global economy have 
evaporated, and so too the easy assumptions of 
the essential compatibility of the cultural and 
economic value embedded in the production and 
distribution of cultural goods and services. As a 
result, the limitations of the CDCE have become 
more pronounced.  
 
The paper therefore goes on to reflect on some of 
these changes and sets them alongside a critical 
review of the core content of the CDCE and some 
of the experience gained from its implementation 
over the first decade. In doing so, we suggest that 
the CDCE has failed to challenge, and sometimes 
reinforced, an essentially ‘economistic’ language 
of cultural and public policy, and that it needs to 
revisit its core values and intellectual 
underpinnings if it is to provide a cultural policy 
resource adequate for today’s challenges. We will 
outline some key areas where new thinking might 
be undertaken and from which UNESCO might 
offer new resources and framings for global 
cultural policy. 
Framing the CDCE 
The CDCE was forged in the context of a long-
running ‘trade and culture’ debate that had flared 
up again significantly in the late 1990s. The main 
sponsors of the CDCE — led by France and Canada 
— sought a binding international instrument that 
could reassert the legitimacy of cultural policy 
mechanisms, such as quotas and subsidies, that 
were seen to be under threat from the growing 
pressures of trade liberalisation and the market 
dominance of powerful global cultural exporters 
(particularly those from the US, who was the 
CDCE’s main opponent). In achieving this, the 
CDCE was built upon the concept of the ‘dual 
nature’ of cultural goods, services and activities, a 
formula that first gained expression in the 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 
adopted at UNESCO in 2001 (UNESCO, 2001). This 
stresses the complementary links that can exist 
between cultural and economic objectives in 
policy and affirms the simultaneously commercial 
and cultural values of cultural commodities as 
both objects of trade and expressions of 
‘identities, values and meanings’ (UNESCO, 2005). 
 
This intervention in the trade and culture debate 
was the key contribution of the CDCE and a key 
test for observers has therefore been its impact in 
the trade context.  There have been a number of 
references to the CDCE in trade agreements 
concluded over the last decade (for an overview, 
see Guèvremont in Chapter 7 of UNESCO, 2017a).  
However, these have been relatively few and far 
between as bilateral and other trade deals have 
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proliferated outside of the WTO arena, and the 
achievement of a number of the core objectives of 
the instrument’s sponsors has been restricted by 
some of the compromises and vague/hortatory 
language that ended up in the final draft.2  
 
A key early test case of the relevance of the CDCE 
in the context of trade regulation and dispute was 
the dispute between the US and China that 
opened in 2007 at the WTO, soon after the CDCE’s 
entry into force. China was the first country to cite 
the new UNESCO instruments on cultural diversity 
(the CDCE and the Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity which had preceded the CDCE in 
2001) in a dispute at the WTO, following a 
complaint that had been filed by the US regarding 
Chinese restrictions on the import of cultural 
goods and services. When the WTO panel 
eventually ruled in favour of the US, many 
observers responded by noting that this offered 
proof of the limited legal and political relevance of 
the CDCE in the context of disputes over trade and 
culture – although there is also some ambiguity 
and disagreement over how the WTO ruling 
should be interpreted in this regard (Garner, 2016: 
120-122). 
 
Looking beyond such questions surrounding the 
CDCE within the context of the trade and culture 
debate, the CDCE has established mechanisms for 
integrating culture within development policies 
and for fostering international cultural 
cooperation. These have had some influence in 
the content of trade agreements — such as the 
Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU 
and the Caribbean regional grouping CARIFORUM 
 
2 One of the most commented upon weaknesses of the 
CDCE in this regard relates to the force with which the 
instrument can act as the kind of ‘counterpoint’ to the 
WTO that its supporters had hoped for.  This stems 
from a number of points in the text of the CDCE, such 
as Article 20 (which concerns the relationship of the 
CDCE to other treaties).  Neil (2006: 260) for example 
was among a number of commentators to note soon 
after its adoption that: ‘[Article 20] does not provide 
the clarity necessary to prevent further erosion of 
cultural sovereignty, let alone begin the difficult 
process of rolling back the extensive influence of the 
WTO and other bilateral and multilateral agreements.’ 
 
concluded in 2008, which marked a breakthrough 
in a number of areas linking culture, trade and 
development, including in the application of 
Article 16 of the CDCE relating to preferential 
treatment for developing countries— and in the 
development of new policy frameworks — such as 
the joint adoption of a Strategy for International 
Cultural Relations by the European Commission 
and the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (European 
Commission, 2016). The CDCE meanwhile 
continues to provide a central reference point for 
advocacy and research that makes the case for 
culture-led development projects, including the 
formation of a number of campaigns that called 
for the inclusion of a goal for culture in the post-
2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
(which was ultimately unsuccessful, although 
culture is given some [brief] mentions in other 
goals); more recently, we see the creation of a 
monitoring framework that attempts to link the 
implementation of the CDCE to the achievement 
of the various SDGs.  
 
The actual impacts of such initiatives in practice, 
however, have so far been quite limited (see for 
example Garner, 2017; Duxbury et al, 2017). This 
has been for a variety of reasons, but it runs much 
deeper than questions of the legal or political 
efficacy of the instrument. The CDCE’s drafting, 
adoption and ratification around the world had 
drawn momentum from a number of factors. It 
coincided with, and has been an important 
contributor towards, the global rise of the 
‘creative economy’ and all the attendant 
developmental, commercial and political 
narratives that spread with infective optimism 
over the 2000s (and which have tended to resist 
close scrutiny, at least until recently) (Banks and 
O’Connor, 2017). This narrative around the ‘value’ 
of culture and the creative economy became 
fused in the CDCE, and in a number of other 
cultural policy fora in this period, with an 
ascendant liberal narrative of diversity and 
sustainable development in a way which appeared 
able to overcome divides between hitherto 
adversaries: including between the conceptual 
and policy domains of culture and the economy 
(expressed in the concept of the ‘dual’ — cultural 
and economic — value of cultural goods and 
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services), and even between the formerly 
antagonistic positions of the North and the South 
on questions of international cultural regulation 
(as had been seen with the controversies over the 
New World Information and Communications 
Order in the late 1970s and early 1980s). Over the 
previous decade, there had already been a 
number of efforts to better theorise the links 
between culture, economy and development — 
most notably the 1995 report of the UN-UNESCO 
World Commission on Culture and Development, 
Our Creative Diversity (UNESCO, 1995) – and to 
fold this into a new international agenda for 
culture and development. However, they lacked 
the kind of political momentum and support that 
the campaign for the CDCE brought to the issue 
from the late 1990s as the trade and culture 
debate rose in significance. 
 
The process of conceptual and political 
rapprochement that came to be forged through 
the campaign for the CDCE has thus involved 
some narrowing of the issue of culture, diversity 
and development, to a particular set of concerns 
that came to be prioritised by governments and 
others immersed in the trade and culture debate 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s: namely, the 
regulation of trade, the growing economic and 
political significance of the cultural and creative 
sectors, and anxieties over the erosion of 
sovereignty regarding questions of cultural policy. 
Although the adoption of the CDCE did indeed 
signify a new international consensus on these 
issues of cultural policy (minus the two states that 
opposed the instrument, the US and Israel), it was 
a consensus rooted in a particular set of 
governmental and commercial concerns centred 
on questions of market regulation and the ‘new’ 
creative economy (Garner, 2016: 103-146). 
 
In this way, the CDCE came to provide a useful 
reference point for a number of stakeholders 
working in the cultural and creative sectors, but it 
also involved relegating many of the other visions 
for cultural policy and cultural development that 
had been articulated over the previous decade.  
Vickery (2018) has argued that this was part of a 
moment in which an ‘ideological chasm’ began to 
open up in the international discourse on cultural 
policy, as the ascendance of the creative economy 
agenda at UNESCO (and partner UN organisations 
such as UNCTAD) increasingly framed the 
narrative on culture and development in 
terminology derived from the neoliberal revival of 
neoclassical economics (terminology which much 
of the work in Our Creative Diversity, as well as in 
a number of other fora, had been at pains to 
problematise). This had the effect of truncating 
the various attempts that there had been at the 
international level to theorise culture and 
economy outside of terms of reference derived 
from an essentially orthodox economics, while 
relegating attempts at developing an agenda for 
cultural policy that spoke to the themes of radical 
democratic pluralism and related questions of 
gender equality, minority and indigenous rights.  
This had already been noted by Albro in 2005 
soon after the Convention’s adoption: 
 
“[D]ebates over the diversity Convention were not 
so much about the relationship of culture to the 
marketplace, or the relevance of culture outside 
the marketplace, as about what the rules of the 
cultural marketplace should be […] The diversity 
of voices that might advance claims turning on the 
recognition of cultural differences within or 
between states, or outside any obvious market 
calculus altogether, are largely marginalized.” 
(Albro, 2005: 252). 
 
There was also an important geopolitical backdrop 
to the CDCE’s adoption, characterised by the post-
Cold War dominance of the US and a pressing 
sense, after 9/11 and the declaration of the War 
on Terror, of the need to avert the ‘clash of 
civilisations’ that had been famously predicted by 
Samuel Huntingdon and others. This was a 
concern which found resonance in UNESCO’s 
mandate to promote peaceful international 
cultural exchange, and it filled the air of the 
General Conference immediately preceding the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity in November 2001 (UNESCO, 2001: 
President’s Foreword), an important milestone in 
the campaign for the CDCE. Adding to this air of 
urgency and solemnity around the kinds of 
narratives that were now being articulated about 
cultural diversity, many also drew parallels with 
the adoption of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (in 1992) and the Universal Declaration 
on Cultural Diversity broke new ground here by 
making formal reference to the diversity of the 
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world’s cultural resources as being as ‘necessary 
for humankind as biodiversity is for nature’ 
(UNESCO, 2001: Article 1). 
 
Such claims for the importance of the cultural 
sector informed a powerful narrative with which 
to build support behind the CDCE in the 2000s.  
They provided a fertile formula with which the 
instrument’s core supporters — the French and 
Canadian governments in particular, as well as a 
number of cultural sector and other stakeholder 
groups — were able to build support behind the 
draft at UNESCO. In the process, it gave a new 
lease of life to arguments about the unique or 
‘exceptional’ nature of cultural goods and services 
which were struggling to gain political support in 
the late 1990s (in what, after all, had until then 
been primarily a North American and trans-
Atlantic dispute over the status of the cultural 
sector in international trade). As the issue of the 
cultural exception widened to encompass 
questions of cultural diversity and was placed on 
the agenda at UNESCO, it found greater 
international resonance and was able to 
accommodate a number of other causes on the 
international agenda (sustainable development, 
artistic freedom and mobility, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, among others), even if 
these largely remained embellishments to the 
central aims of the CDCE to set up mechanisms for 
the protection, production and exchange of 
cultural goods and services. Over the last decade 
however, many of the limitations to the kinds of 
conceptual and political formulae that were 
expressed in the CDCE, have become more 
apparent and the progressive momentum that 
had built up around the drafting and adoption of 
the instrument has diminished. In the following 
sections, we therefore begin to explore some of 
the consequences of this in greater depth. 
The CDCE, Digitalisation and the Sustainable 
Development Goals  
The need to ensure that the implementation of 
the CDCE keeps up with digitalisation and media 
convergence, along with the emergence of new 
players in the global trading environment and the 
evolving needs of the cultural sector, form a 
cluster of issues that have demanded growing 
political, legal and academic attention in recent 
years (see, for example, Richieri Hanania, 2016; 
Garcia Leiva and Albornoz, 2017; Vlassis, 2017; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2018). The regulatory, commercial 
and socio-political implications here are immense 
and pose a number of challenges, although as the 
most recent global monitoring report notes, the 
CDCE text was drafted to be ‘technologically 
neutral’, so as to ensure its continued relevance in 
significantly changed technological conditions 
(UNESCO, 2017a: 20). Whilst this is an 
understandable policy approach, drafted several 
years before the first smartphone or tablet had 
even appeared, the sheer scope and scale of the 
digital transformation, and the serious lack of 
policy preparedness as its ramifications became 
clear, need to be more fully registered.  
 
The guidelines that were adopted at UNESCO in 
2016 to support the implementation of the CDCE 
in the digital environment restated many of the 
key principles of the CDCE: equal access to digital 
space, artistic freedom and fair remuneration 
(piracy included), provisions for preferential 
treatment for the Global South, the rights of 
states to introduce relevant legislation in support 
of culture, and so on (UNESCO, 2017b). The initial 
discussions at the intergovernmental committee 
that had led to the generation of these guidelines 
made reference to the need to make specific 
provisions concerning issues such as the ‘influence 
of data and algorithms on the production and 
distribution of cultural goods and services and the 
issue of media diversity’. The guidelines 
themselves go on to contain a series of 
recommendations regarding the role of the digital 
in creation, production, dissemination, and in 
reformatting the local cultural industries systems, 
diversifying platforms and providing equal 
visibility, especially for local content. Taken 
together, these would represent a radical re-
appraisal of ‘platform capitalism’ in the cultural 
field. However, they lack a narrative capable of 
encompassing the full extent of this new platform 
capitalism – the new powerful monopolies it has 
spawned, the extensive extraction of personal 
data and the new business models around 
commodification and surveillance this has 
introduced, the transformations of multiple 
aspects of social life, and of the media-landscape 
and the sphere of culture itself. That is, though 
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the guidelines cover many crucial aspects of the 
new digital environment for culture, they read as 
a rather bloodless attempt to apply the principles 
of a previous era – culture and economy as win-
win – to this new landscape. Beyond the intrinsic 
limitations that are generally found in operational 
guidelines within the UN/UNESCO systems, there 
is also an absence of a viable counter-narrative to 
that of digital utopianism, the entrepreneurial 
ethos (‘start-ups’), and the on-going 
commodification not just of culture but everyday 
life itself.  
 
As the challenges of digitalisation have become a 
focus of political and regulatory attention, other 
issues relevant to the CDCE have found 
themselves commanding less attention than in the 
previous decade. In one sense, such evolution can 
be seen as inevitable outcome of technological 
transformations and shifts within the cultural 
sector, but it also reflects a prioritisation of the 
issue over others. This is pertinent when 
considering the issue of culture and sustainable 
development, since the CDCE’s contributions on 
this point had been highlighted as among its key 
contributions and had provided an issue around 
which both developed and developing countries 
could find common ground in the 2000s, 
generating momentum towards the instrument’s 
adoption and entry into force. The commitment 
that the developed countries had shown on this 
issue during the 2000s, however, has waned as 
their focus on the CDCE’s implementation has 
been channelled by digitalisation, media 
convergence and the management of the 
economic and political implications of financial 
crises. This was a pattern that was seen for 
example in the relative lack of support that 
developed countries had given to the campaign to 
include culture within the new SDGs as they were 
being formulated prior to 2015 (Garner, 2016: 
236-237; Vlassis, 2015). The theoretical and policy 
connections between culture and environmental 
sustainability meanwhile remain particularly 
underdeveloped, and the field of cultural policy 
more broadly has been very slow to acknowledge 
the environmental impact of cultural production 
and artistic practice.3 The CDCE itself only pays lip 
 
3 There have been some exceptions, particularly at 
service to the notion of sustainability, and 
although the first global monitoring report on the 
CDCE provides a stronger engagement with 
sustainability than the CDCE itself, it remains 
overall more focused on ‘sustainable systems of 
governance for culture’ than the integration of 
‘culture in sustainable development frameworks’ 
(Throsby, in Duxbury et al, 2017: 218). 
 
The relatively disappointing outcome regarding 
the place of culture in the post-2015 development 
agenda, has meant that it is proving difficult to 
keep culture high on the agenda as more recent 
development policies and funding streams are 
being formulated. This simultaneously weakens 
UNESCO’s attempts to draw links between the 
SDGs and the implementation of the CDCE, 
particularly as the organisation once again finds 
itself struggling under budgetary and other 
pressures. It is telling that the proportion of total 
development aid spent on culture fell by 45% in 
the decade after the Convention’s adoption, 
despite mechanisms in the CDCE such as the 
International Fund for Cultural Diversity (IFCD) 
which were designed to encourage Parties to 
make [voluntary] contributions to a pot of funds 
that can be drawn upon for cultural development 
projects. Meanwhile, of the 111 Parties to the 
CDCE that have drawn up national development 
plans or strategy documents, only 40% have 
formulated outcomes or actions specific to the 
goals of the CDCE (UNESCO, 2017a: 171 & 15). 
 
In parallel with this has been a more general lack 
of commitment from the Global North to many of 
the cultural rights initiatives addressed to the 
claims of indigenous peoples. The United Nations’ 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP, adopted 2007) for example has received 
much less backing from the Global North – 
including by key sponsors of the CDCE such as 
 
more local levels.  The UNESCO 2015 monitoring 
report notes for example how a number of 
municipal governments around the world have 
begun to develop some pioneering approaches in 
this regard connecting the cultural and creative 
industries to sustainable development, although it 
gives very little detail on these initiatives (UNESCO, 
2015).   
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Canada (which, along with New Zealand, Australia 
and the US, was 1 of the 4 countries that had 
voted against the adoption of the UNDRIP in 2007, 
only reversing their positions after registering a 
number of reservations about its domestic 
applicability) (Gover, 2015). As a Declaration, the 
UNDRIP remains weaker as an instrument of 
international law and has not given rise to the 
kinds of international legal and policy mechanisms 
that have been seen with the CDCE. The 
relationship of UNDRIP to the implementation of 
the CDCE has not received close attention, neither 
by the Parties nor the various expert facilities with 
which the CDCE has been associated. In part, this 
relates to the divisions within UNESCO between 
the cultural/creative industries focus of the CDCE 
and the tangible and intangible heritage focus of 
the other conventions, under which craft and 
traditional performance are (mostly) subsumed. 
Attempts to discuss crafts within the context of 
cultural industries have frequently met with 
disapproval by UNESCO, even though the visual 
and performing arts are included in the CDCE, and 
crafts can be mainstays of many smaller cultural 
economies. 
 
The kind of turf demarcation noted above is not 
uncommon in policy, but the division speaks of 
something deeper. That is, the ‘culture’ that is the 
object of the CDCE tends to be already conceived 
as market ready product (even if produced for the 
public sector). As we suggested above, despite the 
efforts of groups such as the World Commission 
on Culture and Development and others in the 
1990s, the CDCE speaks primarily to questions of 
market regulation and much less to notions of 
cultural diversity conceived outside of a market 
calculus, or to the market’s relationship with the 
wider socio-cultural world from whence it sprang.    
The strands of anti-development, slow- or no-
growth in the sustainability movement, and the 
deep suspicions of ‘development’ and ‘growth’ as 
intrinsically destructive that are found amongst 
indigenous communities (and other non-orthodox 
perspectives on development), thus go together in 
representing an ‘outside’ to market regulation 
that the CDCE and the activities around it continue 
to have little engagement with in practice.  
 
The Tiring of the Creative Economy Narrative  
This leads us to a number of rather fundamental 
questions surrounding the continued purpose of 
the CDCE in the contemporary context. One is that 
the ‘infectious enthusiasm’ that has surrounded 
the creative economy agenda for the last two 
decades, and which has given the CDCE much of 
its political momentum, is beginning to tire. This is 
apparent in a number of contexts. Firstly, the 
kinds of claims about the instrumental value of 
culture that had gained ground from the late 
1990s have simply become increasingly easy for 
policy actors to ignore, particularly at national 
levels. This is partly because of a continued lack of 
convincing evidence of the cultural sector’s impact 
or value in particular policy domains, and partly 
because once the value of culture is articulated in 
primarily instrumental terms (i.e. its economic, 
social, etc. benefits) then the rationale for policy 
addressed to something called culture — as 
distinct from, say, industrial policy — becomes 
increasingly uncertain (particularly as economic 
concerns have risen on the political agenda). 
 
This logic has left many actors within cultural 
sector in an increasingly uneasy position: as 
Hadley and Gray (2017: 97) write, if instrumental 
outputs are the basis upon which public policy 
concerns itself with culture, and if it cannot be 
convincingly demonstrated that culture 
contributes to these outputs, then why continue 
to fund or support it? Bhakshi and Cunningham’s 
(2016) proposal for a separation of cultural and 
creative industry policies is a reflection of such 
unease with the kinds of connections that have 
been built between cultural and industrial policy 
areas over the last two decades, framing their 
argument with the observation that ‘the 
conflation of culture with creative industries since 
1997 has harmed both cultural policy and creative 
industries policy in the UK’ (Bhakshi and 
Cunningham, 2016: 3). The tendency of 
governments to focus on the faster growing 
sections of the creative industries – digital media, 
advertising and marketing, design – at the 
expense of the slow or static ‘lifestyle’ sectors (i.e. 
artists of various kinds) is clear. The exception has 
been the large-scale cultural flagships, which 
along with media and digital ‘hubs’ or ‘cities’, have 
been used to position cities on a global creative 
map. 
 
This sense of policy fragility is echoed in the 
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waning of the ‘creative imaginary’ which formed 
around the creative industries moment. That 
‘creative imaginary’ envisaged that in the coming 
together of culture and economy, so long set 
against each other, culture would get greater 
policy recognition of its economic importance but 
would also bring to bear some of the values of 
that culture to the policy making process. Valuing 
culture and creativity as part of a contemporary 
economy, it was argued (cf. Landry and Bianchini, 
1995), required a different kind of policy-mindset 
than that of Fordist industrial policy. But the 
‘culturalisation of the economy’ (Lash and Urry, 
1994) turned out to be the ‘economisation of 
culture’ (Oakley and O’Connor, 2015). This could 
be seen in the increasing precarity of creative 
labour (McRobbie, 2016) as well as a significant 
decrease in their sense of creative autonomy 
(Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011). This is a global 
phenomenon, and one which is not just about rate 
of pay and conditions of work but impacts on the 
subjectivities of the once vaunted ‘creative class’ 
(or at least that part of it that was actually 
involved in the creative industries – Florida 
included a wide swath of the professional and 
managerial classes). The association of the 
creative industries moment with the bundle of 
artistic autonomy, grass-roots small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and a loosely networked 
creative milieu, giving rise to a sense of a different 
kind of creative future, has, we would argue, 
largely dissipated (O’Connor, 2019b). Equations of 
‘creative’ with ‘precarious’ labour, and with 
exclusionary practices of gentrification, have 
become commonplace, and easily merge amongst 
the young with a sense of being a ‘surplus’ 
population (Shin, 2019), often fuelling anger and 
alienation (Mishra, 2017). 
 
Underlying these changes in the imaginary are 
transformations in the structures and dynamics of 
the cultural/creative industries themselves. The 
creative industries moment coincided with the 
emergence of a new set of digital technologies 
based in ‘Silicon Valley’, which was less a location 
than an imaginary – or ideology (Barbrook and 
Cameron, 1996) – in which ‘start-ups’ fuelled by 
adventurous investment capital would ‘disrupt’ 
the technologies and business models of the 
incumbent capitalist order. It was a Randian/ 
Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ that would 
deliver not just new growth but a new digital 
democracy – an imaginary that was easily rolled 
into the European discourses of cultural economy. 
However, digital democracy gave way to ‘platform 
capitalism’, in which the successful start-ups — in 
a winner-takes-all scenario — are now bigger than 
many of the older cultural industries corporations 
(Srnicek, 2016; Zuboff, 2019). Even so, these older 
corporations, through a series of mergers/de-
mergers, vertical and horizontal integration/ 
divestment, financialisation and legislative/ 
regulative clout, remain very much in place 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2018). The creative industries 
have not opened up the kind of development 
possibilities envisaged by the supporters of the 
CDCE (O’Connor, 2019a). Indeed, the new powers 
of FAANG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, 
Google) and the telecoms corporations with which 
they are intertwined (both predicated on the 
control of the global information and 
communications infrastructure that the Global 
South had unsuccessfully challenged in the 1970s 
and 1980s in the calls for a New World 
Information and Communications Order at 
UNESCO) are more extensive and intrusive at the 
local level than the older companies ever were. 
Nevertheless, through enhanced intellectual 
property legislation and enforcement, through the 
logistical possibilities afforded by the digitalisation 
of cultural production, and through a proliferating 
set of bilateral and other trade deals that bypass 
the CDCE, the cultural industry corporations 
continue to be dominant at the global level (with a 
few exceptions, such as in China).  
Such developments could be read as confirming 
the continued need for the CDCE as a resource for 
policymakers to pursue certain ‘public’ objectives 
by limiting the power of dominant players in the 
global cultural marketplace. However, it is limited 
in its power to do this on a number of levels. As 
Cornelia Dümcke (a member of the 2005 Expert 
Facility) wrote recently: ‘Globalisation’s promise 
was diversity; its result is the endangerment of 
diversity’ (Dümcke 2017: 43). This is not just at the 
level of nation-states. The localised, embedded 
networks of cultural SMEs and ‘start-ups’ of the 
creative imaginary have also been reconfigured. It 
certainly is possible now for local companies to 
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reach a global audience through the internet, and 
this should not be underestimated. However, the 
platforms on which this access takes place are not 
owned locally (hence the CDCE’s 2016 Operational 
Guidelines). And as before, once a small local 
business tries to scale up, it encounters some very 
powerful corporate entities which vitiate the 
promise of a creative industries-led economic 
development process. Plus ca change, one might 
say.  
The changing cultural policy landscape – and 
the revenge of culture 
Yet the cultural policy landscape has changed – 
and profoundly. One reason for the re-enforced 
dominance of the global cultural industry 
corporations and the expansion of ‘platform 
capitalism’, is that ‘culture’ as a public policy 
object has been effectively marginalised and 
hollowed out. The rise of neoliberalism in cultural 
policy is not simply a growing emphasis on 
economic benefits or econometric performance 
indicators – the rule of the ‘bean counters’ as it is 
commonly described – but involves a distinct form 
of governance (Davies, 2015). Something more 
tectonic has been underway. Neoliberalism’s 
reconfiguration of the state, individual and market 
is one in which the kind of symbolic governance 
associated with culture since the late 18th century 
has diminished in importance. At its core, the 
neoliberal strategy of government is one based 
upon a transformation of everyday individual 
behaviour through tools and metrics, rubrics and 
techniques centred around market (or market-
like) participation and choice. It has little place for 
the sorts of ideological or symbolic subject 
formation associated with liberal cultural policy 
(nation-building and imagined communities; self-
governing citizens; ideological state apparatuses, 
and so on). The neoliberal attack on public culture 
is not aimed just at the public, but at culture as 
part of citizen-formation. Neoliberal cultural 
policy focuses on the proliferation of ‘content’, 
points of access, and means to pay of the 
sovereign individual consumer and the 
aggregation of these individual rational choice-
acts represents the market-collective to 
commercial providers and policy makers.4 
 
In this scenario, the CDCE — focused as it has 
been on questions that revolve around the market 
regulation of cultural goods and services — has 
decreasing traction. Its emphasis on the economic 
benefits of culture — along with the promotion of 
entrepreneurship, business development training, 
value chain development, exports and so on as 
the primary routes to diversity and inclusion — 
have further re-enforced the marginalisation of its 
cultural aspirations. This was not the intention of 
many of its supporters and promoters — and most 
continue to hold onto various other notions of a 
‘cultural’ value of culture — but where the CDCE 
agenda gets closer to the centre of decision 
making, the more it has tended to rely on and re-
enforce an economic agenda. Market regulation, 
which in the 1990s might have implied the state 
setting limits to monopolies, to rampant 
commercialisation, to the penetration of 
international capital into the heart of the culture-
media system, now tends to mean how to adapt 
local cultural production systems to the 
requirements of the international market 
(O’Connor, 2019a). The linguistic and conceptual 
resources for any other kind of challenge to the 
economic logic of the creative industries agenda is 
lacking. It is here, we believe, that a key challenge 
for CDCE lies. 
 
We can see something of this in recent 
developments, what we might call ‘the revenge of 
culture’. As we argued above, the CDCE set out to 
regulate global flows of cultural goods and 
services in the name of global diversity, and to do 
so in ways that evoked the theme of development 
in ways that could benefit the Global South. These 
global cultural flows remained very much in the 
hands of the Global North, and, like the discourse 
of globalisation itself, these flows could easily 
become associated with the import of ‘Western’ 
or ‘cosmopolitan’ lifestyles. Indeed, at certain 
times and in certain places the ‘creative class’ – at 
 
4 A crucial part of neoliberalism was the theory of the 
sovereignty of the consumer in which every act of 
purchase was an exercise of everyday democracy, 
or as Von Mises had it ‘every dollar was a ballot’. 
(Slobodian, 2018) p. 176 
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least the younger end of it – became associated 
with radical political change (e.g. the ‘twitter’ 
revolution), or with a challenge to the cultural 
legitimacy of local conservative regimes. These 
cultural flows were underpinned by a number of 
very real geo-political/economic flows, backed by 
military and legal power, reorganising local 
agriculture, manufacture, telecommunications, 
retail and logistics, water conservation, education, 
health as well as media and cultural industry 
systems. They could alter the very forms and 
rhythms of everyday life (especially in cities). 
What many in the global creative class might see 
as the ‘regressive sameness’ of national cultures 
(Appadurai, 1990) might also speak of a necessary 
sense of local identity and solidarity not just 
against some global ‘difference’ but as a response 
to the real disruption of local lives. The non-
cultural power behind these global flows of capital 
is mostly not amenable to ‘indigenisation’ 
(processes that Appadurai, and other post-colonial 
theorists, saw as giving rise to multiple and de-
centred modernities) without some concerted 
action from the nation-state. Such action can 
often mobilise progressive local political actors 
and coalitions taking a calculated stand with that 
nation state against ‘globalisation’. Which is to 
say, the nation-state remains a touchstone for 
forms of local solidarity and control, and this can 
have powerful cultural dimensions. Wolfgang 
Streeck has made the point, against some 
vociferous opposition from a globalising left, that 
global capitalism’s ‘deterritorialisation’ positions 
the nation-state as a looked-for source of local 
control (Streeck, 2017). Perhaps we might also 
relate this to Karl Polanyi’s notion of the ‘revenge 
of the social’ (Polanyi, 1957) in a prior period of 
rampant capitalism before 1945 (and which he 
believed had been definitively placed behind us). 
Unfortunately, the revenge of culture is by no 
means guaranteed to bring a progressive politics. 
 
The rise of localist and nativist authoritarian 
governments and movements – in Russia, Brazil, 
the US, India, the Philippines, Turkey, Hungary, 
Poland and a host of other nations and regions – 
indicates that the ‘revenge of culture’ can be as 
anti-democratic as the globalising forces it seeks 
to resist. Worse, authoritarian states can operate 
in the register of strong local cultural autonomy 
even whilst in practice accommodating forces of 
global (and local) capital (Turoma et al, 2018). The 
‘revenge of culture’ concerns those elements that 
creativity frequently did not include – traditions, 
rituals, collective sense making (aesthesis). In the 
face of the multiple challenges that globalised 
modernisation brings, many conservative groups 
and states can easily present ‘creativity’ — and 
the people, lifestyles and political agendas which 
go with it — as the personification of global forces 
anathema to local cultures. Conservative or 
authoritarian states rarely blame the erosion of 
cultural cohesion and values on those systems of 
commercial culture that they themselves did so 
much to bring into being and on which they often 
rely for legitimacy. The ‘liberal’, ‘westernised’, 
creative class are stigmatised as the carrier of 
global discourses of human rights, individual 
freedoms and other cultural intrusions which find 
their way into indigenous culture only then to 
undermine it. 
 
In the face of these developments, those invested 
in and around the CDCE would have to articulate 
not only a new language of public value and 
market regulation but also a version of global 
cultural flows that does not play so readily into 
the hands of global corporations and local elites. 
The two are, of course, related.  
Rip it up and start again? 
Are we saying, then, that we need to ‘rip it up and 
start again’? That’s a luxury. CDCE has become 
established as a key international reference point 
addressed to cultural industries and cultural 
diversity. What this paper has tried to do is offer 
some critical engagement with the evolution of 
the CDCE from its genesis in the late 1990s and 
through the first decade of its implementation.  
We have attempted to identify some of its 
limitations in the contemporary context and to 
account for its loss of momentum as an 
international standard bearer for cultural policy.  
In what follows, we suggest some pointers to a 
renewal of the language of the CDCE and to some 
possible ways out of the current cul-de-sac. 
 
First, we can’t go back in search of ‘balance’ 
between those two aspects of ‘dual’ value which 
worked so well to set up the CDCE: it is too late. 
The cultural policy landscape has irrevocably 
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changed, so that there are no longer any easily 
accepted links between ‘culture’ and wider public 
policy goals. The ‘elite’ cultures that received most 
public funding have become more not less 
contentious over the last 20 years. It is no longer 
clear that the actual elites use such culture, or if 
they do it is a long way from classical ideals of 
citizenship, improvement, and social distinction. 
The thrust of post-modernist cultural studies has 
been to place any form of cultural judgement in a 
deeply invidious position, indexed to the (personal 
or class) interests of those seeking to making such 
judgements. And such postmodern tropes have 
now been adapted by the ‘alt-right’ and 
supporters such as Jordan Peterson. Moreover, 
the structural distinction between culture as art 
and an anthropological ‘culture as a way of life’, 
have become hopelessly confused. The latter has 
been used to evoke a popular or everyday culture 
against a reified elite culture, but the values of the 
former have deeply infused the culture of 
everyday life. The cross-overs between art and 
popular culture are well-documented (Frith and 
Horne, 1988; Fisher, 2014) and the ‘creativity’ at 
play in the creative industries drew extensively on 
modernist, bohemian and avant-garde tropes. 
Indeed, a key premise of the cultural/creative 
industries was that everyday life was increasingly 
inflected by aesthetic forms of consumption and 
notions of self (Featherstone, 1991; Lash and Urry, 
1994). In any event, both art and ordinary culture 
have become pervaded by a commercial logic. 
Indeed, art’s accelerated commodification, driven 
by an expanding global art market, has come 
about less through its reduction to a mass 
reproduction commodity (Adorno’s and 
Bourdieu’s fears) but through the artwork coming 
to exemplify the contemporary commodity itself 
(Boltanski and Esqueere, 2016; Lutticken, 2016). 
The experiential, the post-material, the relational 
– these are the desired qualities of a high-value 
added contemporary commodity. The market 
value of an artwork is in inverse relation to its 
heteronomous functionality; its autonomy is 
precisely the site of its commodification. 
The problems of judgement in culture – how are 
decisions to be made if not by the market – have 
multiplied, which is why debates around 
participation – not just consumption but active 
involvement in the on-going process of cultural 
decision making – have become more important. 
These concerns are there in the CDCE but remain 
at the rather abstract level of ‘civil society’ 
involvement. But these questions are not simply 
about the allocation of public funding for culture. 
One of the problems of ‘balance’ is precisely how 
to make judgements of cultural value across the 
whole spectrum of the cultural sphere – which 
includes the media of course. The cultural 
industries were an attempt to achieve public 
policy goals for culture in the realm of industry; 
post the creative industries the rule-of-thumb was 
public policy goals for art and culture, economic 
goals for the creative industries. This distorted 
version of ‘dual value’ has meant that the media 
and design-led industries have been given over to 
the task of delivering economic growth. The small-
scale creative ecosystem is conceived as local, 
developmental context for these large-scale 
industries. Again, the CDCE has been concerned 
with media diversity — increasingly so in the last 
few years — but at operational level too often it is 
the economic development arguments that have 
dominated. How to reconfigure the 
cultural/creative industries as a system that 
produces the ‘social horizon of collective 
experience’ (Negt and Kluge, 1993) and what kind 
of cultural industrial policy that might be applied 
is a crucial question. 
 
But the problem of ‘balance’ is deeper still. It 
cannot be a question of giving the cultural aspect 
more autonomy or weight; the very notion of 
‘economy’ is now deeply destructive and 
debilitating in itself. That is, the ‘economic’ with 
which culture seeks to achieve a balance is no 
longer simply about the necessary resources 
required to produce culture, nor the economic 
benefits that might come along with its cultural 
outputs. The ‘economic’ is now a kind of ‘second 
nature’, a set of laws (like those of physics) about 
which we are told we can do nothing other than 
seek to serve (Latour, 2015). The economy is now 
a transcendent realm and talk of balancing culture 
makes no sense. The route to ‘balance’ now of 
necessity goes via a thorough-going critique of 
economic reason, of the very bedrock of neo-
classical economics. Culture has been very bad at 
doing this. There is much to be gained from closer 
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engagement with the environmental movement, 
to feminist economic critiques, and to the more 
fundamental critiques of ‘development’ that 
include the work of the decades for culture and 
development in the 1990s (e.g. Esteva and 
Escobar, 2017; Sachs, 2017). There has also been a 
lot of valuable work and experience gained from 
the recent developments in indigenous rights and 
Buen vivir (even where the claimed contributions 
from these have been restricted in practice) (e.g. 
Zamosc, 2017; Lalander, 2017). In the Global 
North discourses of ‘well-being’ and ‘eudemonia’ 
have similarly begun to proliferate 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2017; Banks, 2017), often with a 
revisiting of the works of Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum and some of the innovations of Human 
Development. Even within the digital imaginary, 
Postcapitalism has become a more widespread 
term, suggesting in various ways that the current 
capitalist configuration of the economy is holding 
back the human potential of the digital revolution 
(Gibson-Graham, 2006; Mason, 2015). And, as 
noted above, that fraction of the ‘creative class’ 
that bought into the creativity moment, and 
which formed much of the epistemic community 
for the CDCE, has become disaffected. A different 
kind of cosmopolitan subjectivity, which feels 
global and surplus at the same time, might be 
identified across various locales. So far, the CDCE 
has had very little connection with these groups – 
and the recent attempts to create more 
mechanisms for civil society engagement must 
generate meaningful exchanges and outcomes if 
the instrument is to have continuing traction. 
 
But to repeat, we do not advocate ripping it up 
and starting again. Perhaps the failure to get 
culture into the SDGs might flag up a moment of 
crisis. Perhaps the CDCE is best off out of such a 
process, given the extensive and on-going 
critiques of the development agenda at multiple 
levels (Sachs, 2017). The CDCE is the only viable 
global instrument for informing cultural/creative 
industry policy. We have suggested that it has 
been fatally intertwined with an ever more 
destructive economic development agenda, and 
that it might re-examine some of the clever 
contrivances and theoretical innovations that 
allowed the global discourse on ‘culture and 
development’ to be positioned as a new ‘driver’ of 
economic development. This re-examination 
might allow for the CDCE to be reconnected with a 
more radical set of questions around culture, 
politics and the economy; more radical because 
they are facing the sharp consequences of the 
global expansion of the creative economy, as well 
the multiple crises of the neoliberal counter-
revolution of the 1970s. In so doing it would also 
have to identify a new kind of global constituency, 
as the one that drove the creation of the CDCE has 
now dissipated, lost momentum or has their 
attention trained on other matters. The CDCE 
remains crucial because it does act as a 
crystallisation point for a currently dispersed and 
demoralised global epistemic community of 
cultural activists and policy makers. It also acts as 
a source of cultural policy memory in a world 
where public policy in this area has the recall 
capacity of a goldfish. Those working directly from 
and around the CDCE have a vast knowledge and 
experience involved in developing cultural and 
cultural industries policies at local, regional and 
national levels. As we said above, any renewed 
cultural policy will have to deal with complex 
issues of resource allocation, markets, training, 
ecosystem management, participative governance 
and international cooperation which barely exist 
outside of the CDCE community. A period of deep 
reflection is required, not ‘rip it up and start again’ 
but reculer pour mieux sauter. 
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